Score Disclosure - Mikhail Drugov
Tracks
Room: CBE LT2
| Thursday, June 29, 2023 |
| 5:15 PM - 5:45 PM |
Overview
SMART CONTRACTING
Convenor: Richard Holden
Speaker
Professor Mikhail Drugov
Professor
New Economic School
Score Disclosure
Abstract
We study verifiable disclosure by a monopolist when the product has multiple quality attributes. We identify an equilibrium in which the firm discloses a score---the average of the qualities---without revealing any further information. While full unraveling is still an equilibrium, it is dominated by the score equilibrium in terms of ex ante as well as ex post profits. Moreover, it is ``defeated'' by the score equilibrium in the sense of Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993).
Biography
Mikhail Drugov is Full Professor at the New Economic School and currently visiting the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. He obtained his PhD in economics from the University of Toulouse in 2006. He was then a Posdoctoral Research Fellow at Nuffield College and the Department of Economics of University of Oxford. Afterwards, he was an assistant professor at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Then, he visited the University of Warwick for one year and came to the New Economic School in 2014. In 2016-2017 he was visiting the Toulouse School of Economics. He is also a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
