Welfare Comparison of School Choice Mechanisms - Isa Hafalir
Tracks
Room CBE LT3
| Thursday, June 29, 2023 |
| 10:30 AM - 11:00 AM |
Overview
PUBLIC ECONOMICS I
Convenor: Rohan Pitchford
Speaker
Prof Isa Hafalir
Professor
University of Technology Sydney
Welfare Comparison of School Choice Mechanisms
Abstract
We compare the welfare of two widely used school choice mechanisms, the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm and the Immediate Acceptance (IA) algorithm. Our main model involves three students who draw their private valuations from continuous asymmetric distributions over two schools, where one distribution first-order stochastically dominates the other. We show that interim welfare domination does not occur in this asymmetric case. Nevertheless, we establish that IA prevails over DA in terms of ex-ante welfare. Additionally, we investigate unitarian welfare for the model where values over two schools are interdependently distributed. We present sufficient conditions for DA interim welfare to dominate IA, as well as for IA interim welfare to dominate DA.
Biography
Professor Isa Hafalir joined the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University as an Assistant Professor of Economics after finishing his PhD. In 2017, he joined the University of Technology Sydney as a Professor of Economics and the Director of the Centre for Policy and Market Design.
Professor Hafalir is a micro-theorist who uses game theory tools and mainly works in the area of “market design.” He primarily builds and studies models motivated by real-world applications. More specifically, Isa’s research interests are in game theory and market design, with a particular emphasis on auction theory, matching theory, and mechanism design.
Professor Hafalir has a history of leading successful research and contract projects, including funding from the US National Science Foundation, Google Research, the NSW Government and Food Agility CRC.
